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Abstract This paper examines the effects of introducing competition into monop-
olized network industries on prices and infrastructure quality. Analyzing a model
with reduced-form demand, we first show that deregulating an integrated monopoly
cannot simultaneously decrease the retail price and increase infrastructure quality.
Second, we derive conditions under which reducing both retail price and infrastruc-
ture quality relative to the integrated monopoly outcome increases welfare. Third, we
argue that restructuring and setting very low access charges may yield welfare losses,
as infrastructure investment is undermined. We provide an extensive analysis of the
linear demand model and discuss policy implications.
Keywords Infrastructure quality · Deregulation · Investment incentives · Access
charges · Regulation
JEL Classification D43 · L43
1. Introduction
It is commonly accepted among economists and regulators alike that deregulating
network industries—i.e. introducing competition into previously monopolized indus-
tries such as electric power, water, gas, or railroad transportation—can bring about
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considerable welfare gains.1 Yet, recent experiencewith various forms of deregulation
is mixed: on the one hand, there are a number of success stories, typically associated
with the restructuring of telecommunications. On the other hand, there are disturbing
reports on ill-fated attempts to deregulate utilities such as the Californian electric
power industry or the British railroad industry.2 Not surprisingly, these restructuring
disasters have triggered a public debate on the pros and cons of deregulating network
industries.
In this paper, we focus on one particular aspect of this debate, namely the notion
that deregulating an integrated monopoly is likely to bring about a degradation of
infrastructure quality. Abstracting from vertical relations, Spence (1975, 1977) has
established that the quality level provided by a profit maximizing monopolist will gen-
erally deviate from the socially optimal level. When we consider a network monopo-
list’s provision of quality in a vertically related industry subject to regulation, however,
the picture is less clear, as institutional and regulatory details have subtle effects on
investment incentives. In a recent paper, Buehler, Schmutzler and Benz (2004) dem-
onstrate that, for the case of a bilateral monopoly, the network monopolist’s incentive
to invest into infrastructure quality is typically smaller under vertical separation than
under vertical integration, although it is possible to construct counter-examples.
In the present paper, we go beyond the case of bilateral monopoly and extend
previous research along two dimensions: First, in addition to vertical integration and
separation, we consider the case of liberalization, where the network monopolist
also operates in the downstream market. Both under separation and liberalization,
we allow for varying degrees of (imperfect) downstream competition. Second, we
provide a welfare analysis allowing us to discuss how to deal with the price-quality
tradeoffs encountered when deregulating network industries.
We model an industry where an essential input—the network infrastructure—can
be provided at various levels of quality. Network quality is costly to provide but
increases the value of the final product to customers. Under vertical integration, a
single firm chooses both the level of infrastructure quality and the retail price. In
the other market configurations, the upstream monopolist determines infrastructure
quality. Depending on the market configuration, the upstream monopolist’s profits
stem from access revenues (under vertical separation with various degrees of down-
stream competition) or both access and retail revenues (under liberalization with var-
ious degrees of downstream competition). Downstream firms, in turn, pay an access
charge which is exogenously set by a regulator and independent of network quality.
The latter assumption may be justified by noting that quality is usually difficult and
costly to specify and therefore cannot be described ex ante in a contract and ascer-
tained ex post by a court. That is, quality is observable but non-verifiable (see, e.g.,
Laffont & Tirole 1993).
Using a simple model with demand depending on price and quality, we derive
the following main results. First, regulatory authorities do indeed face a price-qual-
ity tradeoff when deregulating network industries, as deregulating an integrated
1 For instance, in his presidential address to the European Economic Association, Newbery (1997,
p. 358) put forward the following thesis: “[. . .] introducing competition into previously monopolized
and regulated network utilities is the key to achieving the full benefits of privatization.”
2 See, e.g., Joskow (2000), Borenstein (2002), and the special issue of the Journal of Industry, Compe-
tition and Trade (2002) for the restructuring of the Californian electric power industry. The Economist
has documented the crisis in the British railroad industry in numerous articles, some with telling titles
such as “ How not to run a railway” (November 25, 2000) and “ Britain off the rails” (March 17, 2001).
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monopoly cannot yield both a lower retail price and higher infrastructure quality.
This follows from the fact that, in order to generate the same investment incentive
as under integration, the access charge under separation or liberalization must be at
least as large as the retail price under integration. Second, we identify necessary and
sufficient conditions under which restructuring and setting the access charge such that
both retail price and infrastructure quality decrease relative to the integrated monop-
oly outcome increases welfare. Third, deregulation may generate welfare losses even
if retail prices decrease. This may come about when the level of the access charge is
low enough to severely undermine the network monopolist’s incentive to invest into
infrastructure quality.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we introduce
the analytical framework. In Section 3, we discuss the equilibrium outcomes under
the various regimes. In Section 4, we derive our main results based on an analysis
of the feasible price-quality bundles under each of these regimes. In Section 5, we
provide an in-depth analysis of the linear demand model. In Section 6, we discuss
limitations and extensions. Section 7 concludes.
2. Analytical framework
2.1. Assumptions
Consider a public utility which provides its final product using a network infrastruc-
ture, and suppose that a provider of the final product (e.g. electricity or transportation
services)must have access to thenetwork (e.g. the transmission grid or railroad tracks).
For simplicity, suppose that one unit of network access is required to produce one unit
of the final product. LetD(p, θ) denote the demand for the final product, where p ≥ 0
is the retail price and θ ≥ 0 reflects network quality.3 In line with the literature (see,
e.g., Laffont & Tirole 1993), we assume that quality θ is observable but non-verifiable,
and hence non-contractible. This implies, in particular, that access charges cannot be
made contractually dependent on θ . We think it is natural to assume that quality is
non-contractible in the present context, as explicitly specifying quality standards is
extremely difficult and costly. Network quality θ can thus hardly be described ex ante
in a regulatory contract, let alone ascertained ex post by a court. This is consistent
with the observation that, in practice, access charges typically reflect network quality
highly imperfectly. We therefore view quality-independent access charges as a useful
approximation to the real world that allows us to expose the basic tradeoffs emanating
from the deregulation of network industries.
In the various market configurations considered below, we let n ≥ 1 denote the
number of firms operating in the downstream market. We assume that the regulator
prescribes a linear access charge a ≥ 0, whereas retail prices remain unregulated.4
We think this is a natural setting, as the deregulation of network industries typically
aims at introducing (imperfect) downstream competition, while using regulation to
contain the network monopolist’s remaining (upstream) market power. Finally, we
3 If quality encompasses multiple dimensions, θ should be interpreted as a real-valued index summa-
rizing the various aspects of quality.
4 As noted by Mandy and Sappington (forthcoming), it is common practice to use uniform and
non-discriminatory access charges. It will become clear, though, that for reasonable values, a fixed
component in access charges does not change the predictions of our analysis.
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let the marginal cost of output be constant and normalized to zero and abstract from
fixed costs of operating the network.5
Throughout the paper, we require that the following basic assumptions are satisfied,
where subscripts denote partial derivatives.
[A1] The demand for the final product, D(p, θ), is twice continuously differentiable
and satisfies Dp(p, θ) < 0 and Dθ (p, θ) > 0. We let P(Q, θ) denote inverse
demand, with PQ(Q, θ) < 0 and Pθ (Q, θ) > 0.
[A2] The revenue function R(p, θ) ≡ pD(p, θ) satisfies
Rpθ (p, θ) = Dθ (p, θ) + pDpθ (p, θ) ≥ 0, for all (p, θ).
[A3] Producing quality level θ costs K(θ), with K′(θ) ≥ 0, K′′(θ) > 0, and K′(0) = 0.
Assumption [A1] makes demand depend positively on quality and negatively on
the price. That is, network quality has a demand-enhancing effect, creating an incen-
tive for the network owner to provide quality. Assumption [A2] imposes that the
marginal revenue of a quality increase is non-decreasing in the retail price. This
assumption allows for both parallel shifts (Dpθ = 0) and rotations of the demand
schedule (Dpθ = 0). All we require is that Dpθ is not too strongly negative (i.e., the
demand schedule must not rotate too much counter-clockwise).6 Assumption [A3]
requires that the cost function is increasing and convex in quality.7
We now describe the instruments available to regulatory authorities.
2.2. The regulator’s instruments
We consider the following policy instruments available to regulatory authorities:
(1) Market structure regulation: When deregulating public utilities, regulatory
authorities may determine the preferred market configuration. In particular,
when restructuring an integrated monopoly, regulatory authorities may decide
whether (and towhat extent) to introduce downstream competition andwhether
to break up the integrated networkmonopoly. That is, theymay decide about the
industry’s future horizontal and vertical structure. We will demonstrate below
that by selecting a particular market configuration—such as vertical separation
or liberalization with a downstream oligopoly—regulators select a particular set
or “menu” of feasible price-quality bundles.
(2) Access charge regulation:Once regulatory authorities have opted for a particular
market configuration (e.g. vertical separation with n downstream firms) and thus
implemented a menu of feasible price-quality bundles, a particular price-quality
bundle is selected by determining the level of the access charge. In an ideal world,
the latter would be chosen so as to maximize social welfare contingent on the
5 The introduction of fixed costs does not affect the results (provided they are not too large).
6 Many standard demand functions satisfy this assumption. For instance, for linear demandD(p, θ) =
α − βp + θ , with α,β > 0, an increase in θ gives rise to a parallel shift of the demand schedule as
Dpθ (p, θ) = 0, whereas for D(p, θ) = α − βp/θ , with α,β > 0, we have a clock-wise rotation due to
Dpθ (p, θ) = β/θ2 > 0. We consider the linear demand example in more detail in Section 5.
7 More generally, the network provider’s cost function may depend on the level of output Q, i.e.,
˜K(Q, θ). We restrict attention to the case where costs are additively separable inQ and θ andmarginal
costs of output are constant and normalized to zero.
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market configuration. In doing so, regulatory policy has to deal with the follow-
ing tradeoff: increasing the access charge enhances the incentive to invest into
infrastructure quality, but also increases the retail price. Conversely, decreasing
the access charge undermines the incentive to invest into infrastructure quality,
while reducing the retail price.
Below, we examine how regulatory authorities can use these instruments to deal
with price-quality tradeoffs when deregulating network industries.
3. Alternative market configurations
We consider market configurations (or regimes) that differ in the number of down-
stream firms n ≥ 1, and in whether the network monopolist is permitted to operate in
the downstream market. We call a regime “liberalization” if the vertically integrated
networkmonopolist operates in a downstreammarket composedofnfirms anddenote
it by L(n).8 If the network monopolist is banned from the downstream market, we
speak of “separation” and denote it by S(n). Finally, we denote the benchmark of ver-
tically integratedmonopoly by I. For notational convenience, we let ρ ∈ {I,S(n),L(n)}
represent the relevant regime under consideration.
We nowproceed to characterizing the price-quality bundles in thewelfare optimum
and the various regimes ρ ∈ {I,S(n),L(n)}.
3.1. Welfare optimum
Let
W(p, θ) =
∫ ∞
p
D(p˜, θ)dp˜ + pD(p, θ) − K(θ) (1)
denote the social welfare function, where the first two terms represent gross consumer
surplus (i.e., net consumer surplus plus consumer expenditure), and the third term
refers to the cost of providing infrastructure quality θ . Thewelfare-maximizing bundle
(p∗, θ∗) solves
Wp = pDp ≤ 0, (2)
Wθ =
∫ ∞
p
Dθ dp˜ + pDθ − K′ ≤ 0. (3)
As the marginal cost of output is zero, the welfare maximizing price p∗ must be equal
to zero. The socially optimal level of quality θ∗ is strictly larger than zero, implying
that the social cost of a marginal increase of quality, given by K′(θ), is just equal to
the marginal increase of gross consumer surplus (i.e., (3) holds with equality).9
Since the vertical structure’s profit is negative in the welfare optimum, we also con-
sider the constrained welfare optimum assuring the vertical structure a non-negative
profit. We provide this optimization problem and its solution in the Appendix. Below,
we shall use the outcome under integrated monopoly as the relevant benchmark, as
it is often taken to approximate the price-quality bundle provided by a monopolistic
public utility prior to restructuring.
8 That is, the integrated network monopolist faces n − 1 downstream competitors.
9 Given p∗ = 0, θ∗ = 0 cannot satisfy (3), as Wθ =
∫ ∞
0 Dθ dp˜ > 0 by Assumptions [A1] and [A3].
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3.2. Vertical integration
Under vertical integration, ρ = I, the monopolist solves the following profit maximi-
zation problem:
max
Q,θ
π(Q, θ) = QP(Q, θ) − K(θ).
Assuming an interior solution, the integrated monopolist’s choices pI and θ I solve
πQ = P + QPQ = 0, (4)
πθ = QPθ − K′ = 0. (5)
For given θ , the equilibrium price pI is strictly larger than zero by (4), causing the inte-
grated monopolist’s output to fall short of the optimal output. Equation (5) indicates
that equilibrium quality θ I is also strictly larger than zero. Whether the integrated
monopolist undersupplies quality is less clear: as is well known from the literature,
the monopolist’s provision of quality depends on the output gap and the effect of
quality on the marginal willingness to pay of the average and the marginal consumer
(see, e.g., Tirole 1988).
3.3. Vertical separation
Under vertical separation with n downstream firms competing à la Cournot, ρ = S(n),
the network monopolist and the n independent providers of the final product play a
sequential game, taking the regulated access charge a and the number of competitors
n as given. This is a simple two-stage game, which can be solved using backward
induction. At the second stage of the game, given θ , downstream firm i chooses its
output so as to
max
qi
πD(qi,Q−i; θ , a,n) = qi (P(Q, θ) − a) ,
where Q−i = ∑j =i qj denotes the sum of the competitors’ outputs and Q = qi + Q−i
denotes aggregate output. Assuming an interior solution, the first-order condition is
given by
πDqi = (P − a) + qiPQ = 0. (6)
Applying symmetry and letting qD(θ ; a,n) denote each downstreamfirm’s equilibrium
output (given quality level θ), aggregate output is given byQD(θ ; a,n) = nqD(θ ; a,n).
In the first stage, the upstream network monopolist chooses quality θ so as to
max
θ
πU(θ ; a,n) = anqD(θ ; a,n) − K(θ).
At an interior solution, the monopolist’s choice of quality as a function of a and n
solves
πUθ = anqDθ − K′ = 0. (7)
Let (pS(n), θS(n)) denote the equilibrium price-quality bundle attained under vertical
separation. Note that these equilibrium values are functions of both the access charge
a and the number of downstream competitors n; varying a thus produces the menu
of feasible price-quality bundles, given ρ = S(n). That is, the choice of a is crucial for
comparing (pI , θ I) and (pS(n), θS(n)). We shall discuss this in more detail below.
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For future reference, let us briefly consider two polar cases. First, setting n = 1
corresponds to a vertically separated industry with a downstream monopoly. Second,
vertical separation with perfect downstream competition emerges when a large num-
ber of firms (n → ∞) compete à la Cournot. In this case, the retail price will be driven
down to marginal cost irrespective of quality θ , so that pS(∞) = a.
3.4. Liberalization
Under liberalization with n downstream firms, ρ = L(n), there is a vertically inte-
grated network monopolist competing with n − 1 independent downstream firms à
la Cournot. Without loss of generality, let downstream firm i = 1 be the vertically
integrated monopolist. In the second stage of the game, downstream firms choose
their outputs according to (6).10 In the first stage, the integrated upstreammonopolist
selects θ so as to
max
θ
πU(θ ; a,n) = P(Q, θ)qD1 + aQD−1(θ ; a,n) − K(θ),
where QD−1(θ ; a,n) = (n − 1)qD−1(θ ; a,n) denotes the output of the firms operating at
the downstream market only. At an interior solution, the integrated network monop-
olist’s choice of quality solves
πUθ =
(
PQ
[
(n − 1) ∂q
D
−1
∂θ
]
+ Pθ
)
qD1 + a(n − 1)
∂qD−1
∂θ
− K′ = 0. (8)
We let (pL(n), θL(n)) denote the resulting equilibrium price-quality bundle under lib-
eralization.
Again, perfect downstream competition will drive the retail price down to the
access charge, just as under separation with perfect competition, i.e., pL(∞) = a. As
a result, the network monopolist will have the same incentive to invest into infra-
structure quality as under separation with perfect downstream competition. It follows
immediately that liberalization with perfect downstream competition produces the
same outcome as vertical separation with perfect downstream competition for valid
access charges.
4. Analyzing price-quality tradeoffs
In this section, we focus on the question of how regulatory authorities might use the
available policy instruments—market structure regulation and access charge regula-
tion—when faced with price-quality tradeoffs. More specifically, we shall determine
the set of feasible price-quality bundles under each regime ρ and ask how to best set
the access charge once a particular regime is in place.
Our first result states that, in our setting, regulatory authorities do face a price-qual-
ity tradeoff when deregulating a vertically integrated network monopoly providing
the price-quality bundle (pI , θ I).
Proposition 1 (tradeoffs) Suppose [A1]–[A3] hold. Further assume that dp/dn ≤ 0
and dθ/dn ≥ 0 under ρ ∈ {S(n),L(n)},n ≥ 1. Then a price-quality bundle (p′, θ ′), such
10 Note that Cournot competition at the downstream level will now be asymmetric as the integrated
firm’s marginal costs of zero will generally differ from competitors’ marginal costs of a.
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that p′ ≤ pI and θ ′ ≥ θ I , with at least one inequality being strict, is not feasible under
ρ ∈ {S(n),L(n)} for n ≥ 1.
Proof With perfect downstream competition, the network provider’s revenues are
given by ˜R(θ ; a) ≡ aD(θ ; a). Hence, the marginal returns to quality are ˜Rθ (θ ; a) =
aDθ (θ ; a), and the effect of an increase in a on marginal returns to quality is given by
˜Raθ = Dθ + aDaθ ≥ 0,
which is nonnegative by [A2]. That is, perfect competition replicates the bundle (pI , θ I)
for pI = a, but it cannot provide a bundle (p′, θ ′) such that p′ ≤ pI and θ ′ ≥ θ I , with
at least one inequality being strict. The claim follows from dp/dn ≤ 0 and dθ /dn ≥ 0
under ρ ∈ {S(n),L(n)} for n ≥ 1. 
unionsq
Proposition 1 demonstrates that restructuring a vertically integratedmonopoly can-
not simultaneously reduce the retail price and increase infrastructure quality. More
specifically, it shows that any price reduction must come at the cost of sacrificing
infrastructure quality (and vice versa).
To understand the intuition for this result, first consider S(n). We want to argue
that the network provider’s investment incentive, ˜Rθ , is smaller than under integra-
tion for any access charge a ≤ pI due to lower returns to increasing θ . To see this,
fix the access charge at a = pI and consider the effect of a quality increase. Holding
retail prices constant, the direct effect of a quality increase is an increase in demand
and thereby access revenues. However, there will also be an indirect (price-mediated)
effect on demand, as retail prices will endogenously rise with increases in θ by [A2].
Since the network owner controls the retail price under integration, the returns to
increasing network quality must be higher than if prices were unchanged by a simple
optimality argument.11 As a result, the investment incentive must be higher under
vertical integration for a = pI . It should be clear that the result holds a fortiori for
a < pI . For a > pI , the retail price must be higher than pI by the profit maximization
of downstream firms. Hence, higher network quality than under vertical integration
can be achieved only by means of higher retail prices.
Next, consider investment incentives under L(n). Any access charge a > 0 leads to
a cost asymmetry between downstream firms, as the integrated firm’s marginal costs
are zero, whereas all other firms’ marginal costs are strictly positive. As the access
charge rises, this asymmetry increases for any quality level θ . It follows that there is
some critical access charge at which the asymmetry is sufficiently large to squeeze
non-integrated downstream firms out of the market. More specifically, for any access
charge a ≥ pI , profits of the non-integrated competitors will be compressed to zero,
which produces an outcome identical to integrated monopoly. Hence, for a ≥ pI , both
price and quality will be the same as under integration.
Having shown that neither S(n) nor L(n) dominate the benchmark of integrated
monopoly in terms of both price and quality, we proceed to a more detailed compar-
ison of regimes. In particular, we compare the benchmark outcome (pI , θ I) with the
feasible outcomes under S(n) and L(n) in terms of welfare. Since these comparisons
critically rely on the regulator’s choice of the access charge, we first provide a general
result on the welfare effects of infinitesimally changing the access charge, starting
from any feasible price-quality bundle (p, θ) under regime ρ. Since deregulation typ-
ically aims at reducing retail prices, we formulate the result in terms of infinitesimal
11 After all, the integrated network owner could simply keep prices unchanged.
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Fig. 1 Welfare effects of reducing the access charge
reductions of the access charge. To avoid excessive notation, we let dp/dθ |ρ(p,θ) denote
the slope of the menu of feasible price-quality bundles under regime ρ, evaluated at
the price-quality bundle (p, θ). Similarly, dp/dθ |W(p,θ) denotes the slope of the welfare
function evaluated at (p, θ).
Proposition 2 (local welfare change) Suppose [A1]–[A3] hold. Consider regime ρ ∈
{S(n),L(n)},n ≥ 1, where the access charge a is such that the resulting price-quality
bundle is (p, θ). Then marginally decreasing the access charge increases welfare if and
only if
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
ρ
(p,θ)
>
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
W
(p,θ)
, (9)
where
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
W
(p,θ)
≡ −Wθ
Wp
= −
∫ ∞
p Dθ dp˜ + pDθ − K′
pDp
.
Proof See Appendix 
unionsq
Proposition 2 states that—starting from an initial access charge a resulting in (p, θ)
under regime ρ—marginally reducing the access charge increases welfare if and only
if the slope of the menu of feasible price-quality bundles under regime ρ is larger than
the slope of the welfare function evaluated at (p, θ). Figure 1 provides an illustration
of Proposition 2, where (pI , θ I) is the benchmark bundle and condition (9) is satisfied.
This result is useful for answering the question ofwhether there is scope forwelfare-
improving deregulation through liberalization. To see this, consider the benchmark
bundle (pI , θ I), which is also feasible under L(n) for a ≥ pI . Proposition 2 shows that
there is scope for welfare-improving deregulation from I to L(n), provided that (9)
holds for ρ = L(n).12
12 A similar result holds for S(∞). It seems unlikely, though, that restructuring will lead to perfect
downstream competition.
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Note that Proposition 2 can be used to evaluate the welfare effects of deregulation
only for regimes capable of reproducing (pI , θ I). For instance, Proposition 2 cannot
be applied to comparisons involving I and S(n),n < ∞, as (pI , θ I) is not a feasible
bundle under the latter regime. Nevertheless, the result is useful for evaluating access
charge regulation under any regime ρ ∈ {S(n),L(n)}, as it allows to determine how
changes in access charges will affect welfare.
Our next result considers the welfare effects of non-infinitesimal changes in the
access charge. We show that even if there is scope for welfare-increasing reductions
of the access charge, there is a risk of setting the access charge too low.
Proposition 3 (global welfare change)Consider regime ρ ∈ {S(n),L(n)},n ≥ 1,where
the access charge a is such that the resulting price-quality bundle is (p, θ). Suppose
[A1]–[A3] and (9) hold, i.e., marginally decreasing the access charge increases welfare.
Then decreasing the access charge by a non-infinitesimal amount may reduce welfare.
Proof We establish the claim using a graphical argument. Suppose decreasing the
access charge by a non-infinitesimal amount does not reducewelfare. Consider regime
ρ in Fig. 1, where all reductions of the access charge resulting in price quality bundles
between (pI , θ I) and (p′, θ ′) increase welfare. Larger reductions, such as the one giving
rise to (p′′, θ ′′), reduce welfare. 
unionsq
Proposition 3 points to the risk of setting the access charge too low: even if there
is scope for improving welfare by reducing the access charge, reducing it by a large
amountmayyieldwelfare losses. Intuitively, this result follows from the fact that reduc-
ing the access charge not only reduces the retail price but also discourages investment
in network quality. The latter effect may well dominate for large reductions in access
charges, giving rise to a negative welfare effect.
5. The linear demand model
In this section, we provide an analysis of the linear demand model, where we can
derive closed-form solutions for prices and qualities. Let us assume that demand is
given by
D(p, θ) = α − βp + θ , α > 0, β > 1/2, (10)
where α and β are exogenous parameters. Further suppose that K(θ) = θ2. Note that
the linear demand example satisfies [A1]–[A3].
Table 1 summarizes the equilibrium prices and quantities as functions of the model
parameters, as well as the respective menu equations describing the feasible price-
quality bundles in (p, θ)-space.
Figure 2 further provides an illustration of the linear demand model for parameter
values α = 4 and β = 0.9.13 Note that price-quality bundles in the southeast corner
are preferred to bundles in the northwest corner. The welfare optimum (WO) is in
the lower-right corner at (p∗, θ∗) = (0, 5), whereas the constrained welfare optimum
(CWO) is at (p∗c , θ∗c ) ≈ (1.7, 3.1). The price-quality bundle (pI , θ I) ≈ (3.1, 1.5) under
vertical integration—where we both have a higher price and lower quality than in
the (constrained) welfare optimum—will be our main point of reference below. All
other regimes are represented by straight lines. Any point on any of these lines can be
13 Qualitatively, the choice of specific parameter values does not affect Fig. 2.
Deregulating network industries 109
Table 1 Prices, qualities, and menu equations
Regime Retail price p Quality θ Menu equation
WO 0 α2β−1 –
CWO α
(4β−1)β
2α
4β−1 –
I 2α4β−1
α
4β−1 –
S(n) 2(n+1)α+an[1+2(n+1)β]
2(n+1)2β
a
2
n
(n+1) p = α(n+1)β +
1+2(n+1)β
(n+1)β θ
S(∞) a a/2 p = 2θ
L(n) 2(n+1)α+a(n−1)[1+2(n+1)β]
2(n+1)2β−2
2α+(n+3)(n−1)aβ
2(n+1)2β−2 p =
α
(n+3)β + 1+2(n+1)β(n+3)β θ
obtained by fixing the access charge at a specific level, i.e., changes in access charges
reflect movements on the lines, whereas changes in regimes are reflected in jumps
from one line to another.14
Using Table 1 and Fig. 2, we now derive a number of results that highlight the
relevance of Propositions 1–3 above. First, inspection of Fig. 2 confirms for the lin-
ear model that there is a tradeoff when deregulating an integrated monopoly (see
Proposition 1).
Result 1 A bundle (p′, θ ′) such that p′  pI and θ ′ ≥ θ I , with at least one inequality
being strict, is not feasible. For improvements in one dimension only, the following
results hold:
(1) Increasing quality to any θ ′ > θ I is feasible under ρ = S(n),n ≥ 2 only, and it
comes at the cost of increasing the retail price to some p′ > pI .
(2) Reducing the retail price to p′ < pI is feasible for S(n),n ≥ 1, and L(n),n ≥ 2, but
it comes at the cost of reducing quality to θ ′ < θ I .
Figure 2 further indicates that liberalization will perform better than separation
when restructuring aims at reducing retail prices. Comparison of the menus S(1) and
S(2) shows that any quality level θ attainable under S(1) may be attained at a lower
retail price under S(2). Thus, S(2) in a sense dominates S(1). Similar arguments show
that S(∞) dominates both S(1) and S(2). That is, the more intense downstream com-
petition, the lower the retail price at which a given quality level may be attained.
The problem with S(∞) is that, in practice, deregulation is unlikely to lead to per-
fect downstream competition. It is thus useful to compare the various regimes to
L(2), which represents the price-quality bundles feasible under liberalization with
two downstream firms.
Clearly, underL(2), quality levels above θ I are not feasible for the reasons discussed
above. However, for any quality level feasible under S(1),S(2), and L(2), liberaliza-
tion offers the lowest retail price and will thus be strictly preferred to S(1) and S(2).
More generally, for a given number of downstream firms, liberalization is preferred
to vertical separation if deregulation aims at reducing retail prices.15 The result still
14 For each line, the left boundary is given by the restriction θ ≥ 0, the right by the highest valid
access charge under the respective regime.
15 In fact, the predictions of the linear demand model are even stronger than this: any quality level
below θ I can be achieved at a lower retail price using a liberalized market with n downstream com-
petitors than under separation with n + 2 downstream competitors for any n ≥ 2.
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Fig. 2 The linear demand example (α = 4,β = 0.9)
holds if the number of downstream firms approaches infinity. In this case, liberaliza-
tion becomes similar to vertical separation, which is reflected in a counter-clockwise
rotation of L(2) onto the lower part of S(∞) where p ≤ pI (see Fig. 2).
Next, we examinewhether there is scope for welfare-improving restructuring in the
linear demandmodel, starting from the benchmark of vertically integrated monopoly.
Substituting (10) into (1) and totally differentiating yields
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
W
(pI ,θ I)
= 1
β
≈ 1.1,
whereas, from Table 1, we have
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
L(2)
(pI ,θ I)
= 1 + 6β
5β
≈ 1.4.
Since dp/dθ |L(2)
(pI ,θ I)
> dp/dθ |W
(pI ,θ I) , it follows immediately that restructuring from I to
L(2) yields welfare gains for suitable access charges (see Proposition 2). A similar
result holds for restructuring from I to S(∞),16 with the qualification that, in practice,
restructuring is unlikely to lead to perfect downstream competition. The next result
summarizes these findings.
Result 2 In the linear demand model, there is scope for welfare-improving deregula-
tion. In particular, for suitable access charges, restructuring from I to L(2) or S(∞)
improves welfare.
In Fig. 2, iso-welfare curves contain all price-quality bundles that yield some con-
stant level of social welfare. For instance, WL(2) gives all price-quality bundles that
yield the same welfare as L(2) provided the access charge is set optimally. At this
optimal access charge, the line of feasible price-quality bundles L(2) is tangent to the
iso-welfare curve WL(2). The notation is similar for all other market configurations.
Observe that iso-welfare curves farther southeast denote higher levels of welfare.
16 For S(∞), we have dp/dθ |S(∞)
(pI ,θI )
= 2 (see Table 1).
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Finally, we consider non-infinitesimal reductions of the access charge, focusing on
the restructuring from I to L(2). Figure 2 indicates that, if the access charge is set
too low, welfare will actually be lower than under integration. More specifically, if
the regulator chooses a very low access charge—a point on L(2) to the left of the
intersection withWI—the resulting welfare will be smaller thanWI . This implies that
there is a risk of setting the access charge too low when restructuring (see Proposition
3).17 In this setting, the critical reduction of the access charge,a = pI −a′ > 0, can be
calculated by equating themenu equation forL(2)with the welfare functionW(pI , θ I)
and then solving for the access charge a′ ≈ 1.1 associated with the intersection point.
The next result summarizes these findings.
Result 3 In the linear demand model, setting the access charge too low may reduce
welfare relative to W(pI , θ I). In particular, restructuring from I to L(2) and reducing
the access charge below a′ ≈ 1.1 reduces welfare.
Result 3 indicates that, starting from a = pI ≈ 3.1, the access charge may be
reduced by almost 65% before restructuring from I to L(2) yields welfare losses.18
That is, at least in the linear model, regulatory authorities have a lot of leeway when
regulating the access charge.
6. Limitations and extensions
We now discuss the plausibility of our results when (1) the network monopolist can
discriminate against downstream rivals, and (2) downstream firms can contribute to
the provision of quality.
6.1. Discrimination of downstream rivals
It iswell known that the integratedmonopolistmayhave an incentive to engage innon-
price discrimination against its downstream rivals (see, e.g., Economides 1998; Mandy
2000; Beard, Kaserman & Mayo 2001; Weisman & Kang 2001). In a recent paper,
Mandy and Sappington (forthcoming) show that both cost-increasing and demand-
reducing sabotage may be profitable from the integrated firm’s point of view under
downstream Cournot competition.19 That is, non-price discrimination of downstream
rivals may occur under the regime ρ = L(n),n ≥ 2.
To see how non-price discrimination of downstream rivals may affect our results,
we consider the case of cost-increasing sabotage.20 Following Mandy and Sapping-
ton, let s ≥ 0 denote the units of cost-increasing sabotage undertaken by the inte-
grated monopolist, assuming that each unit of cost-increasing sabotage increases ri-
vals’ marginal costs by one unit. Further, let κ(s) denote the direct costs incurred when
17 In contrast, if the access charge is set too high, the worst possible outcome is thatL(2) is equivalent
to I, and welfare will thus be the same (this will happen for a ≥ pI).
18 The retail price will then fall by about 29% to roughly 2.2.
19 However, these authors do not consider investment in infrastructure quality.
20 The analysis of demand-reducing sabotage (e.g., quality discrimination against downstream rivals)
is beyond the scope of the paper. In addition, the upstream firm could conceivably lower its own costs
while raising the costs of downstream rivals by allowing the quality of the inputs supplied to them to
decline. At the same time, such quality degradation could be costly if: (a) regulators penalize such
behavior; or (b) the upstream monopolist cannot discriminate between the quality of inputs supplied
to rivals and itself.
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undertaking s units of cost-increasing sabotage, where κ(s) is a non-negative function
increasing in s.21 At the second stage of the game, given θ and s, downstream firm i
now chooses its output so as to
max
qi
πD(qi,Q−i; θ , s, a,n) = qi (P(Q, θ) − a − s) , (11)
whereas the integrated upstream monopolist selects q1, θ , and s so as to
max
q1, θ , s
πU(q1, θ , s; a,n) = P(Q, θ)q1 + aQD−1(θ , s; a,n) − K(θ) − κ(s). (12)
Inspection of (11) indicates that, from the downstream competitors’ point of view,
cost-increasing sabotage is equivalent to an increase in the access charge. That is,
sabotage adds to the asymmetry between the integrated network monopolist and its
downstream competitors, making it more likely that the latter are squeezed out of
the market. In fact, if undertaking sabotage is costless, i.e., κ(s) = 0 for all s ≥ 0 (and
the regulator does not prevent sabotage), the monopolist always chooses s so that
a+ s = pI , forcing its competitors to exit from the market. The resulting price-quality
bundle will be (pI , θ I). However, as sabotage is typically costly, downstream compet-
itors are unlikely to be fully forced out if the access charge is not very high. In any
case, the increase of the downstream competitors’ perceived marginal costs reduces
the efficiency at which the industry’s output is produced. As a result, the retail price p
at which a given quality level θ may be attained should be expected to be higher than
in the absence of sabotage.
We now want to argue that Propositions 1–3 are not affected by the introduction of
cost-increasing sabotage. To see this, first note that Assumptions [A1]–[A3] still hold
under sabotage. Next, consider Proposition 1. Let us first focus on the case where the
downstream market is perfectly competitive and the access charge is a ≥ pI . In this
case, our above discussion suggests that downstream competitors are squeezed out
of the market. The integrated firm’s profit maximization then yields (pI , θ I). Now, for
a < pI , s will be chosen such that the retail price is no larger than pI , implying that
the associated quality level is at best θ I . That is, with perfect competition, an outcome
that dominates the price-quality bundle under I in both dimensions is not feasible.
Assuming that πUsθ (θ , s; a,n) < 0, implying that the network monopolist’s incentive
to invest is decreasing in the amount of sabotage undertaken, leads to dθ/ds < 0, so
that the quality level must be lower than θ I . As to Propositions 2 and 3, allowing
for cost-increasing sabotage will affect the slope of both the welfare function and the
menu equation, but not the sufficient conditions for welfare-improving changes in the
access charge.
6.2. Downstream quality
So far, we have limited ourselves to analyzing the network aspect of service quality.
Particularly, we have modeled quality as a demand-enhancing service attribute, set by
a monopolistic network owner for the network as a whole, and thereby applying uni-
formly to all downstream firms. Frequently however, the quality of network services
as perceived by the consumer depends not only on the quality of the network, but also
on quality attributes set individually by the downstreamfirms. Thus, downstreamfirms
21 We borrow this assumption from Mandy and Sappington (forthcoming). Note that with quality
discrimination, κ(s) might turn out to be negative (see Reiffen 1998).
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can distinguish themselves from competitors through their choice of service quality,
and hence will compete for consumers not only in prices (or quantities) but also in
service quality.
Assuming that firms are competing in prices and quality amounts to assuming
differentiated Bertrand competition. More specifically, for given network quality θ ,
let each downstream firm i = 1, . . . ,n, face a demand function Di(p, z, θ) where
p = (p1, . . . ,pn) and z = (z1, . . . , zn) denote the vectors of retail prices and quality
levels, respectively. Without additional (non-trivial) assumptions on the interplay of
θ and z, the effects of deregulation on the sets of feasible price-quality bundles under
each regime remain ambiguous. However, we believe that studying a richer frame-
work along these lines will be useful for a better understanding of the price-quality
tradeoffs associated with deregulating network industries.
7. Conclusions
Our analysis has produced a number of results that are of relevance for regulatory
policy. First, our model’s most striking message is that, starting from a situation where
an integrated monopolist is in charge of network quality while operating in the down-
stream market, any policy aimed at opening the downstream market to competitors
(and possibly banning the incumbent from that market) cannot simultaneously lead
to both lower consumer prices and higher network quality. This implies that any regu-
latory strategy of breaking up an integrated network monopoly with the explicit goal
of lowering consumer prices must be well aware that it can do so only at the cost of
sacrificing network quality.
Second, although no regime dominates the integrated monopoly in terms of both
price and quality, there is scope for welfare-improving deregulation. Both liberalizing
and separating an integrated network monopoly are capable of generating welfare
improvements by trading off network quality against lower consumer prices in a
socially desirable way (although separation can do so only in conjunction with suffi-
ciently strong downstream competition).
Third, our analysis shows that the realization of welfare gains depends in a delicate
way on the level of access charges set by the regulatory authority. Here, the advantage
of liberalization over separation is that in the former market configuration, the regu-
lator only runs the risk of setting the access charge too low to generate welfare gains,
whereas high-access charges will “at worst” lead back to the integrated monopoly by
driving competitors out of the market.
Of course, onemight argue that these policy implications are driven by the assump-
tion that regulatory authorities dispose of a rather limited set of instruments. If, for
instance, network quality was contractible, almost any level of quality could be imple-
mented. While we have argued that the assumption of non-contractible network
quality approximates regulatory practice fairly well, under a slightly wider interpre-
tation our model may also be used to make a different point: if network quality may
be verified, contractually specified, and enforced, regulators should consider this a
real alternative to breaking up an integrated network monopoly, regulating access
charges, and letting the market do the rest—even if the regulation of quality itself is
costly.
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Appendix
A.1. The constrained welfare optimum
If the social planner aims at ensuring the firm a non-negative profit, he chooses output
and quality so as to
max
p,θ
W(p, θ) s.t. π(p, θ) = pD(p, θ) − K(θ) ≥ 0.
Assuming that the constraint holds with equality, the Lagrangian for this problem is
given by
L(p, θ , λ) =
∫ ∞
p
D(p˜, θ)dp˜ + pD(p, θ) − K(θ) + λ [pD(p, θ) − K(θ)] .
At an interior solution, the constrained optimum (p∗c , θ∗c ) solves
Lp = pDp + λ
[
D(p, θ) + pDp
] = 0,
Lθ =
∫ ∞
p
Dθ dp˜ + pDθ − K′ + λ
[
pDθ − K′
] = 0,
Lλ = pD(p, θ) − K(θ) = 0.
A.2. Proof of Proposition 2
Rewriting the slope of the line representing feasible price-quality bundles under
regime ρ yields
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
ρ
(p,θ)
= dp/da
dθ/da
∣
∣
∣
∣
ρ
(p,θ)
,
i.e., the slope reflects the effects of a marginal change in a on both p and θ . By mar-
ginally reducing the access charge (and thus network quality θ), welfare is increased
if and only if
dW
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
(p,θ)
= Wp dpdθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
ρ
(p,θ)
+ Wθ < 0.
Partially differentiating the welfare function (1) with respect to p and θ yields Wp =
pDp (<0, by [A1]) andWθ =
∫ ∞
p Dθ (p, θ)dp˜+pDθ (p, θ)−K′(θ). Rewriting the above
condition yields
dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
ρ
(p,θ)
> −Wθ
Wp
≡ dp
dθ
∣
∣
∣
∣
W
(p,θ)
= −
∫ ∞
p Dθ dp˜ + pDθ − K′
pDp
.
This completes the proof.
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